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Background: There is a growing recognition of China’s role as a global health donor, in particular in Africa, but
there have been few systematic studies of the level, destination, trends, or composition of these development
finance flows or a comparison of China’s engagement as a donor with that of more traditional global health
donors.
Methods: Using newly released data from AidData on China’s development finance activities in Africa, developed
to track under reported resource flows, we identified 255 health, population, water, and sanitation (HPWS) projects
from 2000–2012, which we descriptively analyze by activity sector, recipient country, project type, and planned
activity. We compare China’s activities to projects from traditional donors using data from the OECD’s Development
Assistance Committee (DAC) Creditor Reporting System.
Results: Since 2000, China increased the number of HPWS projects it supported in Africa and health has increased
as a development priority for China. China’s contributions are large, ranking it among the top 10 bilateral global
health donors to Africa. Over 50% of the HPWS projects target infrastructure, 40% target human resource
development, and the provision of equipment and drugs is also common. Malaria is an important disease priority
but HIV is not. We find little evidence that China targets health aid preferentially to natural resource rich countries.
Conclusions: China is an important global health donor to Africa but contrasts with traditional DAC donors
through China’s focus on health system inputs and on malaria. Although better data are needed, particularly
through more transparent aid data reporting across ministries and agencies, China’s approach to South-South
cooperation represents an important and distinct source of financial assistance for health in Africa.
Keywords: China, Africa, South-South cooperation, Development assistance for health, Foreign aid, Politics, Health
systems, Malaria, Human resources for healthBackground
China’s contributions to global health are remarkable at a
minimum because of its sheer “demographic weight” [1].
Poverty reduction and health improvements in China,
which represents over one fifth of the world’s population,
heavily influence global measures of disease burden as
well as progress towards human development goals. How-
ever, another channel through which China also exerts* Correspondence: kag12@nyu.edu
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China’s diplomatic, political, and economic engagement
on health issues with other developing countries, particu-
larly African countries [2]. Indeed, there is growing aware-
ness of the role of “new” vs “traditional” donors in general
[3]. Such forms of “South-South Cooperation” have been
met with both enthusiasm and antagonism from policy-
makers [4,5]. The most tangible aspect of this engagement
is China’s financing of health projects in Africa. Accurate
and internationally comparable data on China’s aid
activities have, been hard to obtain, and so China’s role
as a global health donor is less well understood andThis is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
iginal work is properly credited. The Creative Commons Public Domain
g/publicdomain/zero/1.0/) applies to the data made available in this article,
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donors [6].
There is evidence that health figures prominently
among China’s foreign aid priorities. In a recent white
paper released by the Information Office of China’s State
Council, improving medical and health services was
named as one of the key priorities on China’s foreign aid
agenda [7]. While China’s engagement as a global health
donor is not new – it dispatched its first medical team
to Algeria in 1963 – its modalities appear to be changing
and growing more prominent in Africa [2]. China hosted
the first-ever Ministerial Forum on China-Africa Health
Development, which was held in Beijing in August 2013
and timed to commemorate the 50th anniversary of
the first Chinese medical team. At this meeting, China’s
President Xi Jinping heralded a “new era” of China-Africa
cooperation on health and noted that “human develop-
ment is at the core of development”, which notably in-
cludes health [8].
However, China’s engagement as a global health donor
in Africa is not well appreciated, which stems largely
from the fact that it has been challenging to track
China’s aid activities due to the fact that China employs
different types of financing instruments than more trad-
itional donors, numerous actors are involved in aid ac-
tivities within China, and because China has chosen, like
most emerging market countries, to not report to inter-
national aid depositories [6]. According to official statis-
tics, China claims to have appropriated $14.41 USD
billion in aid globally over 2010–12 and that just over
half of that aid was allocated to Africa, but these figures
have not been independently validated from other
sources [7]. Recent estimates by researchers have sug-
gested that overall annual China to Africa development
financing could range from as low as $0.58 USD billion
to as high as $18 USD billion [9]. This wide range is due
in part to the use of different sources of data as well as
different definitions of the types of development finance
flows included in these estimates [9]. Additional studies
have investigated the magnitude of Chinese aid to select
African countries, but a lack of systematic, internation-
ally comparable data has limited our understanding of
China’s foreign aid activities [10-12]. Previous studies
have also emphasized that China’s mode of engagement
in Africa differs qualitatively from aid given by more tra-
ditional donors, in particular in the way in which China
builds off of its own experiences as a developing country,
the way in which it strikes a balance between national
sovereignty and collective responsibility, and by using a
mix of “hard” and “soft” instruments of national power to
engender change in recipient countries [13,14].
There is a particularly poor understanding of China’s
health-related activities [15]. Official estimates by the
Chinese government suggest that China’s health aid inAfrica doubled from US$38.5 USD million in 2006 to
US$73.2 USD million in 2009, but it is unclear how
these figures were generated [16]. A recent review of
China’s “distinctive” engagement in global health, the
most comprehensive to date, collected data on Chinese
health aid activities from Chinese data sources and esti-
mated that China provided approximately $150 USD
million annually in health aid to Africa; however a more
detailed breakdown of these resources, including esti-
mates of how much individual countries were receiving
in aid and for which types of activities, was not provided
[17]. China claims that its priorities within the health
sector include constructing health facilities, providing
medicines and medical equipment, dispatching medical
teams, training medical workers, and conducting ex-
changes and cooperation with developing countries, but
these efforts have rarely been quantified or these claims
verified. Qualitative case studies have validated these ac-
tivities as priorities for Chinese aid, but the lack of sys-
tematic data has meant that these efforts have not been
well documented or have determined the extent to which
these patterns hold true in different international contexts
[2,18,19]. As much of China’s health aid appears to be in
kind, it is also difficult to value these projects [17]. In
addition, Chinese motivations behind pledging and dis-
bursing aid to Africa remains controversial, with some
suggesting that Chinese modes of engagement are driven
by economic interests and are therefore focused only on a
handful of natural resource rich countries [12]. The extent
to which these claims also hold true for China’s health aid
has been hitherto untested.
In response to the lack of internationally comparable data
on Chinese development finance flows, AidData, a partner-
ship between the College of William and Mary, Brigham
Young University, and the non-profit organization
Development Gateway, developed the Tracking Under-
Reported Financial Flows (TUFF) methodology to collect
comprehensive and standardized data on development
finance flows between China and African countries [20].
Although this data collection methodology has limitations,
which are further discussed below, the AidData China to
Africa Aid Database (CAAD) represents the first system-
atic and only publicly available database on Chinese devel-
opment finance activities in Africa. In this article, we
analyze the CAAD (version 1.1) to gain insights into the
modes of engagement of China in global health activities
in Africa from 2000–12. We triangulate the data from the
CAAD to other estimates of Chinese aid and compare
data on China’s global health activities in Africa to that of
traditional global health donors.
Methods
Traditional development assistance for health (DAH) data-
bases are based on data collected by the OECD Development
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(CRS), the most comprehensive international database of
foreign aid flows [21]. Since China is not a member of the
DAC and does not report to the CRS, nor does it report
to other international aid repositories, directly comparable
estimates of aid flows from China are not currently avail-
able. The CRS only tracks official development assistance
(ODA)a, which is the form of development financing most
commonly referred to as “aid” [21].
To address the need for more data on Chinese aid,
AidData developed the TUFF methodology to collect
standardized data on Chinese aid activities in Africa.
AidData’s methodology is a two-stage process. In the
first stage, Factiva and government websites were sys-
tematically searched for news articles, reports, and other
mentions of development financing from China to indi-
vidual African countries. In the second stage, trained an-
alysts conducted additional in-depth analysis of all of the
projects identified in the first stage to increase the qual-
ity of the project-level data and to generate standardized
project descriptions, timelines, and estimates of the
value of these projects (if available) in US dollars (USD).
The second stage also includes a data quality assurance
process to triangulate and check the data with additional
sources. For projects with the fewest corroborating sources,
additional English and Mandarin searches – using Google
and Baidu, respectively – were conducted. More details of
the AidData methodology can be found elsewhere [20].
The CAAD was designed to include many of the same
variables contained in the CRS in order to increase the
comparability of the datasets.
Although the types of development finance provided
by China are not entirely comparable to that given by
traditional donors [22], CAAD projects were categorized
in a way to increase comparability to other international
aid repositories [20]. In this study we restrict our analysis
to official government financing, which in the CAAD
includes projects defined as “Official Development As-
sistance (ODA)-like”, “Other Official Finance (OOF)
Flow-like”, “Other Official Investment”, or Vague, which
are projects which are either ODA-like or OOF-like but
for which there is not sufficient information to distinguish
between the two categories [20]. Of the 255 HPWS pro-
jects in the CAAD, 205 (or 80%) of these projects were
characterized as being “ODA-like”, only 9 were character-
ized as OOF (3.5%), 41 were characterized as Vague
(16.5%), and there were no HPWS projects that were char-
acterized as being “Other Official Investment”. Since we
are not able to discretely eliminate all OOF from the
Vague projects in CAAD, and since it is challenging to
identify health specific OOF from DAC, we elected to
keep all data in the CAAD. This is an important limitation
of our comparison of Chinese health aid with that of more
traditional donors.CAAD projects were mapped onto the standard CRS
activity codes. We restricted our analysis to projects in
the health (120), population (130), and water and sanita-
tion (140) sectors. As with the CRS, HIV/AIDS-related
activities are included in the population sector. In this
article, we collectively refer to these three sectors as
“HPWS projects.” We further restricted our analysis to
all projects that were defined as firm commitments, pro-
jects that were already in the works, or completed pro-
jects. We excluded projects that had yet only been
pledged from our analysis. In addition, in the CRS there is
a sub-sector activity code (160.64) for social sector sup-
port to HIV/AIDS. Hence, all projects in the CAAD coded
160 were manually inspected for health-related content,
yielding two additional projects that were recoded as ei-
ther 120 or 130.
While there are limitations of the CAAD data collec-
tion methodology, namely biases in the types of projects
that might get reported in the media, language and
media-based constraints, and limits on the quantity and
quality of information collected, there is significant value
in analyzing this data to gain insights on China’s global
health engagement in Africa. The use of datasets with
similar data collection methodologies is increasingly
common in many social sciences [20]. To better under-
stand the quality of the data in the CAAD, AidData re-
cently undertook a validation exercise of the CAAD in
Uganda and South Africa. This exercise largely confirmed
the value of the CAAD in practice [23]. Since many of the
projects contained in the CAAD lacked a dollar amount,
and due to the uncertainty in the true value of the pro-
jects, particularly those which are in kind, in the CAAD,
we chose to focus most of our analysis based on the num-
ber of projects rather than the value of these projects. All
dollar amounts, where available, are reported in constant
2009 USD.
To compare China to more traditional global health do-
nors, project-level data from CRS (activity codes 120–140,
plus 160.64) were also obtained for the years 2000–2012
from the OECD web portal (accessed March 1, 2014).
Countries were coded using the International Organization
for Standardization alpha-3 country codes.
To more qualitatively understand the types of health
projects supported by China, short descriptions of each
project included in the CAAD were analyzed for health
and health system content. Health system keywords in-
cluded words for pharmaceuticals (“drug” or “pharma”),
human resources for health (“team”, “doctor”, “nurse”,
“scholarship”, “midwife”, “midwive”, “personnel”, or “staff”),
infrastructure (“hospital”, “construct”, or “infras”), equip-
ment (“surg”, “equipment” or “technol”), and research
(“research”). Health condition specific keywords included
HIV/AIDS (“hiv” or “aids”), malaria (“malaria”), tubercu-
losis (“tuberculosis” or “tb”), maternal and child health
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“maternal”, “child”, or “measles”), and non-communicable
diseases (“smoking”, “cardio”, or “cancer”).
Finally, to determine whether Chinese health aid was pri-
marily targeted towards natural resource rich countries, we
extracted data on the total nature resource rents (as a % of
GDP) from the World Development Indicators [24]. We
specifically used data from 2005 for all African countries.
Results
Table 1 summarizes the main features of the CAAD. The
CAAD contains detailed information on 1,686 projects
that had either been committed, were being implemented,
or had been completed and for the years 2000–12. Of
these projects, we identified 255 HPWS projects that were
allocated to 46 individual African countries or regionally.
Each country received on average 5.5 HPWS projects.
Health activities accounted for 79% of all HPWS projects,
5% for population activities (including HIV/AIDS), and
16% for water and sanitation projects. HPWS comprised
15.1% of CAAD projects.
As previously mentioned, not all projects in the CAAD
had an assigned dollar value, and since there is great po-
tential for discrepancies in the amounts pledged and re-
ported in the media versus the actual amounts disbursed,
the total dollar estimates need to be interpreted cau-
tiously. Nonetheless, the CAAD contains information on
1,686 projects in 50 African countries and on $84 USD
billion in commitments of official finance, of which HPWS
projects represent a little more than $3 USD billion, or
only 3.6% of the valued projects. There were large differ-
ences in whether an HPWS project was valued: only half
of health projects had a dollar amount assigned to them
in the CAAD, while 79% and 73% of population and water
and sanitation projects, respectively, had been valued. Liu
et al. report that health projects are more likely to be in
kind, for example the deployment of medical teams, which
may help to explain the lower rates of valuation in health
projects [17].
Table 1 also provides the average size of valued projects














Health* 201 78.8 1,325 13
Population* 14 5.5 37 3.3
Water and Sanitation 20 15.7 1,667 57
Total HPWS projects 255 3,030
Total CAAD projects 1,686 84,811
*CRS activity codes are as follows: Health, 120; Population, 130; Water and Sanitatio
manual inspection of the entries coded in 160 were added to the appropriate healtsmallest (an average of $3.3 USD million per project) and
unsurprisingly water and sanitation projects are the largest
at $57.5 USD million per project. To try to account for
unvalued projects, and simply as a thought exercise, if we
naively assume that projects that were not valued were
similar to those that did receive a valuation, and multiply
the total number of projects in each category by the aver-
age value of valued projects in each category, we estimate
that the total amount of Chinese health aid for the entire
time period could be as high as $5 USD billion (calcula-
tion not shown) from 2000–12, however, we note this
figure is highly speculative and do not place much weight
on this estimate.
Figure 1 compares the trends in number of projects
from China relative to DAC donors by year and by sec-
tor. A number of interesting observations can be made.
First, similar to DAC donors, China increased the num-
ber of projects it supported in Africa over 2000–09 but
appears to have slightly decreased the number of pro-
jects thereafter. Second, China appears to have different
health priorities than DAC donors: nearly half (48%) of
all HPWS projects by DAC donors to African countries
over 2000–12 supported population programs, mostly
HIV/AIDS projects [25]. By contrast, only 5% of HPWS
Chinese projects supported population programs. In fact,
further analysis of the descriptions of these projects re-
vealed that only two HPWS projects in the CAAD included
the words “HIV” or “AIDS”. Most of the increases in the
number of Chinese projects were driven by increases in
the number of health projects, whereas the increase in
projects from DAC donors was primarily driven by the
increase in population projects.
Figure 2 investigates whether the increase in number
of HPWS projects reflects a general trend in all develop-
ment projects from China to Africa, or whether health
has increased as a priority on China’s foreign aid agenda.
Health appears to have increased as a priority through
2009; however, in recent years health projects as propor-
tion of all projects has decreased slightly.
Table 2 compares the magnitude of Chinese health aid to
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n, 140. In addition, two health and population projects identified from the
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2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
year
All projects HPWS projects
Proportion HPWS
Figure 2 Health, population, water, and sanitation projects as a share of all China to Africa aid projects (2000–12).
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Table 2 Bilateral health aid contributions to Africa, by
donor (2000–12)





1 United States 31,626.5 2,432.8
2 EU Institutions 8,796.8 676.7
3 United Kingdom 6,050.5 465.4
4 France 5,001.9 384.8
5 Germany 4,949.7 380.7
6 Japan 4,456.3 342.8
7 Canada 4,065.4 312.7
8 Netherlands 3,903.7 300.3
9 China 3,029.6 233.0
10 Denmark 2,200.1 169.2
Source: CAAD (China, in bold) and OECD CRS (other donors). Figures refer to
only bilateral health aid contributions.
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cludes their donations to multilateral institutions) by the
top 10 donors. Limitations of the data notwithstanding,
China would rank ninth in bilateral health aid to Africa
among bilateral donors, behind the Netherlands but ahead
of Denmark. Since many of the other top ranked bilateral
donor countries are also major multilateral donors, and
China has given relatively little to global health multilateral
programs until more recently, this ranking should be inter-
preted only with regards to bilateral contributions [17,26].
Table 3 provides a ranking of the top 10 recipients of
health aid from both Chinese and DAC donors. Only
two countries (Ghana and Kenya) make it onto both top











Cameroon 840.9 Nigeria 10,502.6
Ghana 740.1 Ethiopia 8,981.2
Kenya 271.1 Tanzania 8,818.0
Sudan 227.7 Kenya 8,654.9
Zimbabwe 223.7 Uganda 6,54.9
Angola 107.8 Mozambique 6,295.1
Mauritius 84.9 South Africa 6,060.6
Côte d’Ivoire 80.6 D.R. Congo 5,237.8
Zambia 64.7 Zambia 4,814.9
Niger 64.7 Ghana 4,335.9
Sum of top 10
recipients
2,706.1 70,248.0
Source: CAAD for China and OECD CRS for other DAC donors. Figures refer to
only bilateral contributions and, in the case of China, only to valued projects.traditional donors in terms of where they target their aid.
Chinese aid also appears to be much more heavily concen-
trated than DAC donors: their top 10 recipients received
89% of all Chinese health aid whereas the top 10 recipi-
ents of aid from DAC donors only captured 55% of DAC
donor commitments.
Figure 3 illustrates the relative priority given to indi-
vidual recipient countries by China versus DAC donors.
Each recipient country is ranked on the number of pro-
jects it received from China (x-axis, increasing priority
from left to right) and DAC donors (y-axis, increasing
priority from bottom to top). The diagonal line repre-
sents the point of equal prioritization. There appears to
be moderate correlation between the priority given to
African countries by China and DAC donors (Spearman
correlation coefficient of 0.44). However, there are a few
notable outliers, including a number of countries that
received no funding from China, namely Egypt (EGY),
Benin (BEN), the Gambia (GMB), Equatorial Guinea
(GNQ), Burkina Faso (BFA), Chad (TCD), Swaziland
(SWZ), and Sao Tome and Principe (STP). Interestingly,
the Gambia, Burkina Faso, Sao Tome and Principe, and
Swaziland have all recognized the sovereignty of Taiwan,
which appears to have made them ineligible for Chinese
support. Although it has been suggested that China is
using its foreign aid as a means to secure natural re-
sources and expand its commercial market, it is not ob-
vious from our data that this is in fact the case for
health [12]. While some natural-resource rich countries
such as Sudan (SDN), Ghana (GHA), and Niger (NER)
appear to have more priority from China, there are also
examples of other naturel resource rich countries that
receive less priority from China including Zambia
(ZMB), Nigeria (NGA), and the Democratic Republic
of the Congo (COD). Resource rich countries actually ap-
pear to be prioritized by both types of donors.
To more formally test whether or not natural resources
are an predictor of health aid from China, we plot both
the total amount of funding each African country received
in Chinese health aid over 2000–12 and the number of
projects it received from China relative to the proportion
of its GDP that represent natural resource rents, which in-
clude oil rents, natural gas rents, coal rents, mineral rents,
and forest rents (using data from 2005 for all countries).
These data are plotted in Figure 4. There does not ap-
pear to be any significant relationship between either of
these indicators of Chinese aid with resource rents. If we
crudely regress measures of Chinese aid (number of pro-
jects and total funding) on this measure of natural re-
source rents, the coefficients on rents are actually negative
but not statistically significant, suggesting that there is no
positive relationship between these indicators for Chinese
health aid as has been suggested by observers for Chinese


































































Ranking in CAAD database
Note: Countries are labeled with ISO 3166−1 alpha−3 country codes, the complete list of which is provided by
the UN Statistics Division website (http://unstats.un.org/unsd/methods/m49/m49alpha.htm).
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Note: Countries are labeled with ISO 3166−1 alpha−3 country codes, the complete list of which is provided by
the UN Statistics Division website (http://unstats.un.org/unsd/methods/m49/m49alpha.htm).
Figure 4 Relationship between Chinese aid and natural resources.
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in the project descriptions. We exclude water and sanita-
tion projects from this analysis since most of these pro-
jects support infrastructure and are by nature not
targeted to health systems or to specific disease condi-
tions. Projects can independently be tagged with more
than one keyword and hence sum to more than 100%.
More than 50% of the health and population (HP) pro-
jects in the sample target infrastructure. This includes
many large hospital construction or renovation projects.
Human resources for health (HRH) make up a signifi-
cant (40%) portion of the health aid portfolio. Chinese
aid in HRH is provided as either deployment of medical
teams or training of local health personnel. Chinese
medical teams make up a major part of the HRH portfo-
lio: Liu et al. [17] appraised the value of Chinese medical
teams in Africa to be about $60 USD million annually
from 2007 to 2011. Training of health personnel can in-
clude training that happens in Africa or in China: China
provides scholarships for foreign medical students to be
trained in Chinese universities and also supports gov-
ernment officials, technical professionals, and students
to participate in training and education taking place in
African countries.
The provision of equipment (a quarter of HP projects)
and drugs (a fifth of HP projects) is also common. Among
the health conditions targeted by Chinese aid, only malaria
appears to a priority for the China, with about a third
of projects targeting malaria. Many of these malaria pro-
jects were also tagged for pharmaceuticals, suggesting
































































Figure 5 Content analysis of Chinese aid projects by health system an(i.e. artemisinin), as previous studies have suggested, are
in fact common [27,28].
Discussion
This article provides a multi-country description of
Chinese official health financing for health related activ-
ities in Africa. Using AidData’s CAAD, we identified 255
HPWS projects from China to 46 African countries, with
an estimated value of approximately $3 USD billion in
financing over 2000–12. Over time, health financing
from China to Africa has increased in terms of both the
number of projects and as a proportion of all Chinese de-
velopment finance flows to the continent. Chinese health
developing financing is large and would rank it among the
leading bilateral global health donors to Africa. China,
however, appears to have very different health priorities
than DAC donors, with much more emphasis on health
system projects and HRH, and much less emphasis on
disease-specific programs, notably HIV/AIDS, which has
been the predominant priority of DAC donors in Africa
[25]. We do not find evidence that Chinese health aid is
targeted specifically to resource rich countries. Rather, we
find most countries in Africa have received some aid from
China during the period of study.
Despite the important caveats mentioned above in the
valuation of projects, our estimates suggest that China
has been pledging health projects valued at $231 USD
million a year on average to 46 African countries over
the past decade or roughly $5 USD million per country
per year. However, Chinese aid appears to be more con-
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aid to Africa.
By comparison, using 529 sources of manually collected
information, Liu et al. [17] estimated China disbursed
$150 USD million in health aid annually, but likely ex-
cluded projects in water and sanitation. Given these differ-
ences as well as the differences in methods employed in
collecting data, we believe that these two estimates cor-
roborate each other. Our estimate of China’s health aid is
however, higher than figures released by the Chinese gov-
ernment in 2011 [7]. Chinese officials themselves have la-
mented about the challenges in tracking their own aid
flows [29]. While the total amount of money we identify,
roughly $3 USD billion in funding over 12 years, is rela-
tively large, spread out among the large number of coun-
tries in Africa receiving support from China, this would
not translate into large amounts of aid per country, which
might also help to explain why much of China’s aid activ-
ities have received little attention from the global health
policy community.
There are many limitations in the data employed in
this study. The CAAD should be interpreted with cau-
tion given its different methodological approach to data
collection than the CRS. In some cases, the CAAD may
overestimate the value of aid projects, as the media may
be more likely to report larger rather than smaller projects.
Plus, the media may report a project at the announcement
stage, at which point funds are only committed and not
the actual amount of the funds that are disbursed. The
CAAD also cannot identify projects that are canceled be-
fore implementation. The CAAD may also underestimate
the true value of China’s development finance flows since
not all projects were valued and the use of triangulating
news reports to government reports accessible to the pub-
lic is only a proxy for official government reporting. The
mere fact that fewer than half of the health projects and
only three quarters of the population and water and sanita-
tion projects were valued in the CAAD suggests that valu-
ation of projects is not even across categories, adding to
the difficulty of extrapolating the value of non-valued pro-
jects. Compared to water and sanitation projects, health
projects are more likely to be in kind [17] – through the
exchange of visiting health workers and the transfer of
medicines, equipment, and other supplies, which could
make it more difficult to appraise the value of these pro-
jects. In addition, the CAAD data cannot be seen as repre-
sentative of all of China’s development finance activities, in
particular, we focus mainly on projects that are predomin-
antly ODA-like, but we recognize differences remain be-
tween these datasets.
For these reasons, this paper has emphasized the de-
scriptive uses of the CAAD data. Our study findings largely
corroborate with what others have identified in more
qualitative analysis or in country case studies, with somenotable differences, in particular the claims of emphasis
on HIV/AIDS projects and the targeting of resources to
natural resource rich countries.
Despite the difficulty of valuing in-kind projects, the
costs per unit of health service delivered financed by
China’s national and provincial governments is likely lower
compared to traditional western donors [30]. For example,
the cost of paying the salary of a doctor originating from
China and supported by his or her given Chinese provin-
cial government dispatched to a given African country as
part of a Chinese medical team is certainly lower than the
cost of paying an international NGO’s doctor salary sup-
ported by a Western Government. As a rough back-of-
the-envelope calculation, 1160 Chinese medical workers
were deployed in 2013 and were valued at $60 USD mil-
lion annually by Liu et al. [17], or about $50,000 per
worker (which includes not only salary, fringe benefits,
housing, food, and travel costs, but also the project’s ac-
companying medicines and medical equipment as well).
Conclusions
African countries require additional funding to meet the
Millennium Development Goals (soon the Sustainable
Development Goals), achieve Universal Health Coverage,
and other global health priorities, and given that aid
flows from traditional donors have plateaued in recent
years, there is a need to find new sources of funding for
these additional resources [31]. This study suggests that
China may already be helping to fill these needs by fund-
ing health activities in ways that are complimentary to
those provided by DAC donors. Plus, China’s engagement
with its African partners is qualitatively different and, ac-
cording to the government policies, guided by principles
of non-interference with domestic affairs of a recipient
country, mutual benefits in economic development, and
self-determination among partner countries, which con-
tinues to be enshrined in its government policies.
Based on its recent experience with economic develop-
ment and improved population health, China may have
more to offer African countries than just financial re-
sources. The challenges China historically faced in raising
population health status were embedded in the health sec-
tor and related sectors, such as agriculture, education, and
the environment. The same holds true for African coun-
tries today. China has acknowledged these parallels when
charting out a long-term vision and financial commitment
to partner countries during high-level policy dialogues.
Chinese policy-makers also believe that such shared
experiences deepens their diplomatic relationships with
Sub-Saharan African countries.
China’s engagement in global health is rapidly expand-
ing in other ways beyond the financing of projects in
other countries [32-34]. It has, for example, been a lead-
ing player in promoting and supporting inter-BRICS
Grépin et al. Globalization and Health  (2014) 10:84 Page 10 of 11country initiatives in health [33]. Public-private partner-
ships and institutional capacity-building for R&D between
China and other low- and middle-income countries have
led to new, lower-cost product pipelines for new drugs,
vaccines, and diagnostics [35]. China has begun to play an
increasingly strategic role in providing technical assistance
to missions related to infectious disease control [36]. This
engagement has been noted in the media coverage of the
current outbreak of Ebola in West Africa, where China is
among the leading donors to the development response
and quickly sent a large number of medical teams to the
affected countries. To date China’s contributions to multi-
lateral programs has been minimal, but there are signs it
may be increasing its commitments to such efforts [32].
Given China’s recent experiences in health system re-
form and signaled shift at the recent Beijing Declaration
towards “universal coverage of health services” and “sus-
tainable, long-term health solutions”, China’s government
has an opportunity and a potentially comparative advan-
tage over other bilateral donors to provide different types
of support to African countries [37-39]. Nevertheless, all
donors including China must consider improving their de-
velopment activities to support increased aid effectiveness,
which could include the use of performance-based finan-
cing and improved performance verification, the use of
objective criteria to make allocations across countries, and
greater experimentation and learning [40-43]. Imposing
health priorities on other countries may have unintended
consequences on African’s relatively weak health systems
[25,44]. At the very least, an important first step will be to
increase the transparency around its health and develop-
ment related activities in other countries so that recipient
countries policy makers alike are better able to track and
measure the impact of China’s official health financing ac-
tivities in Africa [6].
Endnote
aThe DAC defines ODA as “grants or loans to countries
and territories and to multilateral agencies which are: (a)
undertaken by the official sector; (b) with promotion of
economic development and welfare as the main objective;
(c) at concessional financial terms (if a loan, having a grant
element of at least 25 per cent).Competing interests
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